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Abstract 
Integrated security systems (ISS) are responsible for the physical protection of NPPs. Integration is often understood as specific solutions 
designed to provide for interaction between products from one manufacturer. The industry standard STO 1.1.1.04.007.0814-2009 was introduced 
in 2009 to solve the problem of compatibility between products from different manufacturers. The compliance with this standard is confirmed by 
certification. An automated test bench and AtomTest, a dedicated software product, were developed as part the certification activities. The key 
functions of the developed software are presented, and the mechanism of its operation and output data are described. AtomTest was used in the 
laboratory testing of seven major Russian ISS manufacturers. As the result of the activities performed, six manufacturers were given certificates of 
compliance with the standard. 
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B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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 Physical protection of NPP is regulated by Russian law. Re-
gardless of the application, it is based on automated security,
life support and engineering equipment control systems. Many
developers refer to their “brainchildren” as integrated security
systems (ISS). 
An ISS is a package of interacting software and hardware
products designed to ensure physical security and automation of
life and facility operation support with a capacity for technical,
information, software and operating compatibility. 
The security of a facility is usually ensured by a number of
subsystems, including burglar and fire alarm systems, admission
monitoring and control, and TV surveillance subsystems, and
the developer of these subsystems is not always one [1] . This
“classic” set may also include an active firefighting system
and engineered subsystems for the life support of a building.
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ubsystem was assigned to at the design stage [2,3] . Unfor-
unately, because these subsystems are intended for specific
pplications, contradictions may arise in dealing with particular
ituations at the facility, leading to serious problems: 
− a loss in the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities by
the security service “overloaded” with a large number of “di-
verse” control terminals; 
− special-purpose controls are complicated because of being
assigned to new functions; 
− lack of coordination in the operation of various subsystems; 
− potential generation of mutually exclusive commands by sub-
systems. 
Thus, the problem of integrating the ISS components from
ifferent manufacturers in one package remains high on the
genda [3] . This problem can be solved in full only through
he operation of systems in a single information environment
sing a standardized communication protocol, as regulated
y the standard [4,5] . In nuclear power, such standard is STO
.1.1.04.007.0814-2009 “A System for the Collection andw Engineering Physics Institute). Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
ons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the automated test bench during testing. 
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Fig. 2. Test status form. 
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P  
orocessing of Information from a Package of Engineered
ystems for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Power Plants.
pecifications" (the Standard hereinafter). 
This standard establishes uniform requirements to the archi-
ecture of the ISS systems used at NPPs, to their smallest required
unctionality and, the most important thing, to the construction
f data exchange between the software components of systems
API SS or server SS) based on the integrated upper-level pro-
ocol, which is actually a description of the available commands
irculating in the ISS systems, in the XML language [6,7] . 
Assessing the compliance of typical ISS systems with the
tandard required a certification procedure to be undertaken,
ased on the results of which certificates for conformity were
xpected to be given to the developer. 
An automated test bench enabling testing of fully functional
SS mockups was developed at the test laboratory of ATEKS
td. for carrying out certification activities. Specialized software 
SS) was assigned to the key function of analyzing in detail the
etwork traffic among components of the test bench systems
 Fig. 1 ). 
Based on the requirements of the Standard, tests were ex-
ected to support the solution of the following tasks: 
− input of information on tested system components; 
− specification of the test parameters and depth; 
− system readjustment of the data package routes between
tested components and retransmission of messages; 
− automated execution of tests, including automatic checks of
commands, their sequence and generation algorithms for the
compliance with the requirements of the Standard; 
− automated collection and recording of information on the
checks performed during tests; 
− input of additional information and the operator comments
with respect to each test; 
− recording of all testing stages, archiving of test results in the
local database, and generation of test reports with their further
printout. 
Since the existing software for analyzing the computer net-
ork traffics (such as Wireshark or Tcpdump) was not fit for the
bove task, AtomTest software (the Program hereinafter) was
eveloped. The program consists of several interlinked dialog forms
alled in by predefined algorithms of call chains. The dialog
orms are based on a web-interface. The information displayed
n the dialog forms depends on the program execution context. 
Testing may consist of different sets of tests. All tests are
ivided into two groups: automatic tests and tests run by the
perator. 
To retransmit messages automatically between the computer
quipment of the system, the capability of the operational sys-
em’s network services is used to dispatch all packages using the
reset routing tables. The Program changes the package routing
ables after it is connected to the test system. To do this, when the
onnections are set up, it is necessary to specify the following
arameters of the computer hardware: IP-addresses, logins and
ser passwords, and the numbers of the computer equipment’s
CP- and UDP-ports through which messages are exchanged. 
After the configuration is completed, the Program proceeds
o waiting for the initiation of the exchange between the server
S and the API SS. After the server SS is connected to the API
S, automatic testing is switched over to. 
During each test, the Program, while implementing the deter-
inistic finite-state engine, is waiting for the preset conditions
f transition from one state to another until the final state is
eached. For each type of test there is a special state engine, and
he selection of the state engine depends on the selection of the
est type in the test description template. During the test, the Pro-
ram checks all protocol commands sent by the server SS and
y the API SS, and records all events. The collected test data is
tored in the draft test folder and is used for the generation of a
est report with a statement of the compliance of the tested items.
he statement of compliance is accepted by the Program auto-
atically based on the predefined test template which is fully
onsistent with the given test procedures, while the procedures
s such satisfy to the requirements of the Standard. 
At the end of the test (after the final state of the finite state
ngine is reached), the Program proceeds to the test completion
tage. The test status form displays information on the test re-
ults. The Program proceeds to the next test when the operator
resses the “Continue” button ( Fig. 2 ). 
After the final test in the testing program is completed, the
rogram automatically reconfigures the system back to standard
peration. 
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[  At the next stage, the Program automatically generates
reports on each test in .html and .pdf formats. The report
generation time depends on the number of the tests and the
volumes of reports. 
Using the developed Program, seven major Russian ISS
makers and suppliers of hardware and software products to
NPPs have been tested in laboratory conditions (since this
paper does not have an advertising purpose, no manufacturers
or system names are given). Six manufacturers have been given
the certificates of compliance with the Standard. 
Therefore, the results obtained prove that it is possible
to integrate components from different ISS manufacturers.
However, tests have shown that the Standard has inaccuracies
and clauses that could be unambiguously interpreted. There
is no doubt that further activities are required in the given
field, including analyses of designs and regulations in related
industries and the updating of the Standard’s requirements and
the protocol to make them more clear. eferences 
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